Motivated by a recent World Bank report on achieving of Millennium Development Goals which shows that poverty has been declining in all regions of the world with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), this study puts some empirical structure to theoretical and qualitative studies on the reconciliation of the Beijing Model with the Washington Consensus.
Introduction
The positioning of this inquiry is motivated by three main contemporary challenges to African development, notably, the: (i) heartbreaking trends of extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); (ii) growing role of the middle class in development outcomes and gaps in the corresponding literature and (iii) debates over the relevance of the two dominant models of development in African development policy.
First, an April 2015 report by the World Bank on the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target has shown that, with the exception of SSA, poverty has been declining in all regions of the world (World Bank, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Tchamyou, 2018) . The narrative maintains that 45% of nations in the sub-region were offtrack from achieving the MDG extreme poverty target. This disturbing trend starkly contrasts with evidence that during approximately the same interval of increasing extreme poverty, the sub-region has been enjoying over two decades of growth resurgence that began in the mid 1990s (see Fosu, 2015a) . The worrisome statistic has motivated a growing stream of literature devoted to understanding and solving SSA's poverty tragedy. Fosu (2015b Fosu ( , 2015c , motivated by the need to understand if Africa's recent growth resurgence is a myth or reality, has edited a plethora of studies assessing the role of institutions in Africa's development. Kuada (2015) has recommended a paradigm shift from 'strong economics' (or structural adjustment policies) to 'soft economics' (or human capability development) as means to understanding Africa's poverty tragedy. The narrative of Kuada (2015) on 'soft economics' for employment, poverty alleviation and inclusive growth in Africa accords with another stream of African development literature that has focused on the need to tailor foreign aid policies towards alternative channels in order to boost employment, reduce poverty and improve human resources Page & Söderbom, 2015; Simpasa et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2016a) .
Second, the role of the middle class is paramount in contemporary African development because of the benefits it has been associated with, notably: (i) historical perspectives that the middle class was essential in the development of Europe and North America (Landes, 1998; Adelman & Morris, 1997) and (ii) contemporary positions that the middle is essential in mitigating poverty (Easterly, 2001) , improving social progress (Sridharan, 2004) , good institutions (Birdsall, 2007a) , innovation and entrepreneurship (Banerjee & Duflo, 2009 ), inclusive development (Birdsall, 2010) , institutional reforms (Loyza et al., 2012) and promotion of democracy (Kodila-Tedika et al., 2016) . More specific ϯ contemporary middle class African development literature has focused on four main themes, namely, the: measurement of the middle class (Resnick, 2015a (Resnick, , 2015b Cheeseman, 2015; Mattes, 2015; Shimeles & Ncube, 2015; Tschirley et al., 2015; Thurlow et al., 2015) ; relationship between the middle class and economic growth (Tschirley et al., 2015; Handley, 2015) ; nexus between governance and the middle class (Mattes, 2015; Cheeseman, 2015; Resnick, 2015b) and the role of the middle class in debates between the relevance of the Washington Consensus (WC) versus the Beijing Model (BM) in African development Asongu, 2016b) .
Third, the African middle class has been subject to a recent debate on the relevance of the two dominant development models for the continent's development. This growing stream of literature is consistent with the view that a burgeoning middle class is essential for a sustainable demand for political governance which is a priority of the WC. It is interesting to note that the priority of the BM is economic governance. Hence, the middle class has been used to reconcile the relevance of the WC and BM for Africa in the short-run and long-term respectively. In essence, the BM is defined as 'state capitalism, de-emphasised democracy and priority in economic rights' whereas the WC is defined as 'private capitalism, liberal democracy and priority in political rights' (Asongu, 2016b) . The BM has delivered a middle class to China within a breathtakingly short spell of time. The middle class reconciles both paradigms in the perspective that Asongu and Ssozi (2016) have suggested that the Washington (resp. Beijing) model should be pursued as a long-(resp. short-) term development goal because only a burgeoning middle class may be required to sustainably demand political rights. Unfortunately, this interesting stream of qualitative and theoretical literature has not been substantiated with empirical evidence.
Noticeably, the above literature leaves space for improvement in the need for an empirical insight into the role of the WC and the BM in elucidating SSA's extreme poverty tragedy. The objective of this inquiry is therefore to fill the identified gap by investigating whether low income countries of the sub-region would achieve more inclusive human development by prioritising economic governance in place of political governance. Hence, the testable hypothesis is that, compared to middle income countries, low income countries would achieve more inclusive development by focusing on economic governance as opposed to political governance.
In the light of the above, three contemporary paradigm shifts motivate the inquiry.
These are, the need: for a complementary framework that reconciles the two dominant ϰ development models ; to shift from 'strong economics' to 'soft economics' or human development as means to understanding the poverty tragedy of the continent (Kuada, 2015) and for shifts in macroeconomic policy that emphasise the middle class instead of outweighted outcomes of economic growth (Birdsall, 2007b) .
Some stylized facts also motivating the study are briefly discussed. As apparent in Figure 1 , from 1990, extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of SSA. According to Shimeles and Ncube (2015) , since 2000, the African continent has been experiencing a rise in middle class income. Accordingly, most of the countries that have enjoyed considerable growth in the middle class have equally experienced substantial growth resurgence during the same period. The remainder of the study is organised as follows. The data and methodology are covered by Section 2. Empirical results, discussion and implications are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes with future directions.
Data and Methodology

Data
The study investigates a panel of 49 countries in SSA with data from World Development Indicators for the period 2000-2012. The start-year is consistent with a recent phase of a rising African middle class (Shimeles & Ncube, 2015) , while the end year is due to constraints in data availability. The inclusive development dependent variables is the inequality adjusted human development index (IHDI). This is in line with recent African inclusive development literature (Asongu et al., 2015) .
In order to increase room for policy implications, nine unbundled and bundled governance indicators are used. Accordingly, six governance variables from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are bundled into three more governance variables in order to articulate the concept of governance, namely: (i) political stability/no violence and "voice and accountability" for political governance; (ii) government effectiveness and regulation quality for economic governance; and (iii) corruption-control and the rule of law for institutional governance.
The classification of income groups is in accordance with the World Bank's categorisation of income levels. These are: high income, $12,276 or more; upper middle income, $3,976-$12,275; lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and low income, $1,005 or less (Asongu, 2014, p. 364) .
Four main control variables are selected, namely: remittances, private domestic credit, foreign direct investment (FDI) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth. The selection of these variables is consistent with recent inclusive development literature (Mlachila et al., 2017; Seneviratne & Sun, 2013; Anand et al., 2012; Mishra et al., 2011) . In line with the underlying literature, positive linkages are expected between the control variables and the IHDI. Accordingly, Mlachila et al. (2017) have established positive relationships between inclusive growth and the last-three control variables while remittances are also intuitively expected to increase inclusive human development because they are destined for consumption purposes for the most part .
The definitions and sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 discloses the summary statistics, while Appendix 3 provides the correlation matrix. It is ϲ apparent from the summary statistics that the means of variables are comparable and from standard deviations or corresponding variations, reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge.
The objective of Appendix 3 is to control for multicollinearity. The high degrees of substitutions that are apparent among governance indicators are tackled by employing governance variables in distinct specifications.
Methodology
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
As apparent in the correlation matrix, the governance indicators are characterised by high degrees of substitution. While principal component analysis (PCA) has been used in contemporary African development literature for the purpose of limiting concerns of multicollinearity and over-parameterisation (Tchamyou, 2017) , its application in this study is also for conceptual clarification. The PCA is used to clarify the notion of 'governance' in adopted variables. For instance, while there are "voice and accountability" and political stability indicators, there is no political governance variable per se. Given that the previoustwo are constituents of political governance, PCA can be used to bundle the constituent indicators into a composite measurement called 'political governance'.
The PCA is a statistical strategy that is employed to reduce a set of highly correlated indicators into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components (PCs).
These PCs constitute a substantial variation of information in the initial dataset. The criterion used to retain PCs is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) . The authors have recommended that only PCs with an eigenvalue that is higher than the mean should be retained.
Economic governance which consists of government effectiveness and regulation quality represents the capacity of the government to formulate and implement policies that deliver public goods. Political governance consisting of political stability and voice and accountability is the election and replacement of political leaders. Institutional governance that is represented by the rule of law and corruption-control denotes the respect by the state and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them. As shown in Table 1 , economic governance (Ecogov), has an eigenvalue of 1.878 and represents about 93.90% of information in the constituent indicators, notably: government effectiveness and regulation quality. In the same vein: political governance (Polgov) and institutional governance (Instgov) ϳ respectively have: eigenvalues of 1.671 and 1.861, respectively and variations of 83.50% and 93.0%, respectively. The obtained PC-augmented regressors provide robust estimates. For the purpose of brevity and lack of space, the interested reader can refer to Nwachukwu (2016a, 2016b) for insights into the efficiency, consistency and inferential validity of PC-augmented regressors. 
Estimation technique
A fixed effects (FE) empirical strategy is adopted in order to control for the unobserved heterogeneity. The corresponding panel FE model is as follows.
where t i IHD , is the inclusive human development of country i at period t ; ∂ is a constant; G , Governance (political, economic and institutional) ; IL , income levels; GIL , interaction between Governance (G) and income levels (IL); W is the vector of control variables (GDP per capita growth, Foreign direct investment, Remittances and Private domestic credit); i η is the country-specific effect and t i, ε the error term. Given that interactive regressions are involved in the specification, the study is consistent with Brambor et al. (2006) in involving all constitutive terms into the specifications, unless in cases of perfect multicollinearity. (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Robustness checks with interactive regressions
Further discussion and implications
Investigated hypothesis and nexus with the literature
The investigated hypothesis has been validated with the outcome of the empirical analysis. Accordingly, it has been established that 'low income'-driven economic governance contributes more to inclusive human development compared to the effect of 'middle income'driven economic governance. Therefore, from an economic governance perspective, the findings run counter to a strand of the existing literature which maintains that the middle class improves governance standards for positive social outcomes (Resnick, 2015a; Easterly, 2001; Birdsall, 2007a) . The findings from an economic governance standpoint accord with the pessimism of Rodrik (2015) who is of the stance that the growing African middle class may not play a crucial role in the strengthening of governance structures for inclusive development.
The findings support the stream of literature sympathetic to the view that some middle classes may fail to demand better economic governance for inclusive development because they may have interests in specific markets and state resources (Poulton, 2014) . Hence, an ϭϭ African middle class can stifle good economic governance exclusively to protect its own interest. 
Theoretical and practical contributions
Theoretical and practical contributions can be discussed in three main strands, notably: prescriptions of the Washington Consensus that prioritise political governance . Today, differences in development between China and SSA are self-evident, with the former helping the latter on many development fronts. In light of this explanation, it is apparent that in order to address the post-2015 African extreme poverty challenges, low income countries in SSA will benefit substantially in terms of inclusive human development if they prioritise economic governance over political governance in the short term. This ϭϮ recommendation is made within the framework that the Washington Consensus is a long-term development model. Third, validation of the investigated hypothesis can also be understood in the light of conceptions of 'rights', namely: the 'right to vote' (or political rights) versus the 'right to basic needs' (economic rights). Political rights (or political governance) have been recently established to be more endogenous to economic rights (or economic governance) in Africa (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014) . Hence, economic rights should be short-term priorities while political rights should be long-run priorities. Within this framework, low income countries should prioritise economic governance over political governance (at least in the short-term).
When a burgeoning middle class has been attained through inclusive human development, the demand for political rights is very likely to be sustainable and effective because members of the middle class would no longer be concerned about basic human needs like food and shelter. The findings have confirmed the investigated hypothesis because in non-interactive regressions, contrary to middle income countries where the effect of economic governance is not significant, in low income countries, economic governance drives inclusive human development. Using interactive regressions, the hypothesis is still confirmed because evidence of increasing (resp. decreasing) marginal effects of economic governance is apparent in low (resp. middle) income countries. It follows that, the effect of low income in the 'economic governance-'inclusive development' nexus is likely to be U-shape while the impact of middle income in the 'economic-governance-'inclusive development' relationship is likely to be Kuznets or hump shape.
Conclusion and further research directions
As a main policy implication, in order to address inclusive development challenges in the post-2015 development agenda in SSA, it would benefit low income countries in the subregion to prioritise economic governance (or the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities). Other theoretical and practical contributions have been discussed. Future studies would enrich the literature by engaging country-specific studies to ϭϰ investigate whether the established linkages withstand further empirical scrutiny within country-specific settings. 
Appendices
Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of variables
